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Abstract
Auctions employing steeper securities generate greater revenues when bidders have
equal opportunity costs. However, when opportunity costs rise sufficiently quickly with
valuations, security bids decrease in NPV and steeper securities reduce seller revenues.
We show that when such adverse selection obtains, using combinations of securities
with differing steepness can generate higher revenues than using securities of the same
steepness. We determine the optimal combination of cash plus equity; identify a novel
way of implementing the optimal mechanism via decreasing royalty rates; establish the
robustness of the mechanism; and identify when auction designs combining cash with
steeper-than-equity securities increase seller revenues.
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1 Introduction
In many auctions, bidders pay not with pure cash, but with securities or combinations of cash
and securities. For example, Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) report that payments
for 70% of mergers and acquisitions are either entirely in equity, or feature combinations of
equity and cash; and Skrzypacz (2013) highlights how oil and gas lease auctions and timber
lease auctions typically feature cash payments plus equity payments in the form of royalties.
The distinguishing feature of such security-bid auctions is that the payment’s value is tied to
the cash flows the bidder generates (Hansen 1985; Demarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz 2005).
For instance, in a takeover auction, an acquirer’s offer to pay a fraction of the merged firm’s
equity has a monetary value that is proportional to the value of the joint firm, v, which is
the sum of the target’s value under the bidder’s control plus the bidder’s standalone value.
DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzpacz (2005) provide a comprehensive analysis of security-bid
auctions. They show that a critical factor determining seller’s revenue is the steepness of the
security, which measures the sensitivity of the security’s value to the underlying cash flows.
For instance, call options are steeper than equities, which are steeper than cash. Demarzo
et al. (2005) find that if bidders have private information about the asset’s value but their
opportunity costs of winning (e.g., standalone values in takeover auctions) are identical, then
auctions using steeper securities yield a seller greater expected revenues.1
In practice, bidders with higher valuations v may face greater opportunity costs x(v),
for example reflecting that an acquiring firm with a higher standalone value is more likely
to generate higher synergies. So too, in project-rights auctions, a higher valuation may re-
flect that the resources a bidder must commit if it wins may alternatively be more valuably
employed elsewhere. Moreover, these opportunity costs are typically private information. If
x(v) increases in v sufficiently fast, then an extreme form of adverse selection obtains (Che
and Kim 2010): bidding strategies in security-bid auctions are decreasing—bidders with high
NPVs bid less because they incur all of their high opportunity costs but only retain a share
of their high valuations—so that steeper securities yield lower seller revenues.
1Work on rent extraction and security-bid auctions includes Hansen (1987), Fishman (1988, 1989),
Dasgupta and Tsui (2004), Board (2007), Povel and Singh (2010), Kogan and Morgan (2010), Gorbenko
and Malenko (2011), Skrzypacz (2013), and Sogo, Bernhardt and Liu (2016). See Burkart and Lee (2015)
for security design in takeover settings.
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Our paper shows that when adverse selection obtains, auction designs that combine secu-
rities with differing levels of steepness can yield higher revenues than auction designs that use
securities from any single class of steepness, and that the greater the difference in steepness
between the securities, the better it is for the seller. Underscoring how combining different
classes of securities can help, we establish that when (1) extreme adverse selection arises
with equity, and (2) x (·) is weakly convex, a seller can extract all rents—the highest-NPV
bidder wins and receives zero rent—by using positive combinations of cash and equity. By
contrast, using either pure cash or pure equity would generate strictly less revenues. We
solve for the optimal combination of cash and equity, and provide the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for full extraction via cash and equity. Our cash-plus-equity mechanism is
robust: a seller can extract almost all rents when the seller only knows the approxiate form
of x (·). Moreover, when the conditions for full extraction via cash plus equity fail, we show
that auction designs combining cash with securities that are steeper than equity can increase
seller revenues. Collectively, our findings reveal how the insights of DeMarzo et al. (2005)
on the advantages of steeper securities extend to settings with adverse selection when the
seller can combine auction design with security design.
The intuition is as follows. When bidding strategies are decreasing in equity auctions,
low-NPV bidders may extract more rents with equity payments than high-NPV bidders. By
contrast, all bidders value cash in the same way, so that with cash a bidder’s rent always rises
with his NPV. Starting from pure equity, one can reduce the equity payment and increase the
cash payment, so that the differential rent of a low type over a high type falls, crossing zero
at some point. We derive conditions on xi (·) for all bidders i under which a mix of equity and
nonnegative cash exists that (1) makes the (local) differential rent zero at all values of vi, (2)
ensures the (global) incentive-compatibility of the mechanism, and (3) selects the highest-
NPV bidder whenever this NPV is positive. With such a mix, a seller extracts full rents.
Our result is even stronger than what this discussion may suggest. In equity auctions with
decreasing strategies, it may still be that, as in pure cash auctions, high NPV bidder types
extract more rents than lower bidder types. Thus, one might conjecture that in such cases,
when a seller uses positive combinations of cash and equity, high types would earn strictly
more rents than low types, implying that full extraction is impossible. This conjecture is
false: the optimal mix extracts rent more efficiently than do standard formats. In the full-
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extraction mechanism, a seller tailors the menu of payment combinations so that (1) higher
types choose a less steep mix that requires them to give up a smaller equity claim to their
higher expected revenues in return for a higher cash payment; while (2) lower types choose
steeper mixes because they care less about ceding greater equity claims to lower revenues,
and more about the cash payment. By properly choosing the rate of variation in the steepness
of the mix, a seller can reduce the differential rents between high and low types to zero.
We extend the analysis to a more general setting that relaxes restrictions on xi(vi)—
adverse selection need not be extreme—and allows for negative cash payments. We derive
the necessary and sufficient conditions for full extraction via combinations of equity and cash.
Global incentive compatibility of a mechanism that extracts full rents via cash-plus-equity
requires that xi (·) be weakly convex. When this condition holds, our mechanism can be im-
plemented simply by having bidders bid cash with a royalty-rate that declines with the cash
bid. Moreover, we establish that a seller can extract almost all surplus if xi(vi) is ‘almost’
convex, or if there is limited uncertainty about the value of xi conditional on vi. As noted
at the outset, auctions involving positive combinations of cash and security payments are
common in oil, gas and timber lease auctions, and (positive) combinations of cash and equity
are often used in mergers and acquisitions. Our analysis provides foundations for such mixes.
Our mechanism has the desirable feature that it is dominant strategy incentive compati-
ble. A bidder’s winning payment depends only on his own report; and if a bidder misreports
and wins, his profit is negative—and strictly negative if xi (vi) is strictly convex. Thus, the
mechanism extracts full rents even from a single bidder, absent the competition that Cre´mer
and McLean (1985, 1988) exploit when bidders have correlated signals.
We then go beyond equity-plus-cash designs to let sellers use securities from an ordered
set (Demarzo et al., 2005). Focusing on equity plus cash is not without loss of generality: if
xi (vi) is not convex, a seller cannot extract all rents with equity and cash, but can do so using
cash and steeper-than-equity securities if xi(vi) is not too concave. Intuitively, the security
payment and opportunity cost collectively comprise a bidder’s costs, and convexity in a secu-
rity’s expected payoff can compensate for a lack of convexity in xi (·). Moreover, if the bidding
strategy would be decreasing in a pure security bid auction, a seller can extract all rents
by combining securities and positive cash, generating more revenues than with either the
security or cash alone. Collectively, our findings indicate that when adverse selection arises,
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a seller is better off mixing the least-steep security (cash) with the steepest security. The mix
creates wider variation in the resulting steepness, which helps reduce the differential rents of
higher types over lower types and ensure the global incentive compatibility of the mechanism.
Ekmekci, Kos, and Vohra (2016) consider the sale of a firm to a single buyer who is
privately informed about cash flows and the benefits of control. The seller can offer a menu
of cash-equity mixtures, and the bidder must obtain over 50% of the target to gain control.
They provide sufficient conditions for the optimal mechanism to take the form of a take-it
or leave-it offer for either the smallest stake in the firm that facilitates transfer of control, or
for all shares of the firm. By contrast, we show how combinations of equity and cash–where
the resulting steepness varies with bidder type–improves seller revenues, and how auction
designs that use steeper-than-equity securities can help further.
2 The model
A group of n ≥ 1 risk-neutral bidders competes to acquire an indivisible asset. Each bidder
i has a private type vi ∈ [vi, v¯i], where 0 < vi < v¯i < ∞, and vi is the expected revenues
generated by the asset if bidder i wins. That is, the asset yields a stochastic cash flow with
an expected value of vi under the control of that type of bidder i. We assume that vi is
distributed according to a continuous and strictly positive density, fi, and that valuations
are independently, but not necessarily identically, distributed across bidders. We denote
the joint density of the valuations of bidders other than i by f−i (v−i) ≡ Πk 6=ifk (vk), where
v−i≡ (v1, ..., vi−1, vi+1, ..., vn). We normalize the asset’s value to the seller, if retained, to 0.
With equity payments, only the expected cash flow is relevant, but when we allow for more
general security payments, their values depend on the details of the cash flow distribution, re-
quiring us to impose more structure. We assume that when controlled by type vi of bidder i,
the asset generates a stochastic cash flow yi ∼ g (yi|vi) with full support on (0,∞), where the
family of probability density functions {g (·|vi)} has the strict monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty (sMLRP): g (y|vi) /g (y|v′i) increases in y for vi > v′i, i.e., higher signals are good news.
Bidder i has an opportunity cost xi(vi) that varies with his valuation. We assume that
xi(vi) is a continuous and twice-differentiable function of vi ∈ [vi, v¯i]. Thus, the expected
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NPV (value added) of the asset if i wins is vi − xi(vi). Define Si to be the set of vi for
which there exist realizations of other bidders’ types such that selling the asset to bidder i
maximizes expected social surplus, i.e.,
Si = {vi|vi − xi(vi) ≥ 0 and for all j 6= i, vi − xi(vi) ≥ min
vj
{vj − xj(vj)}}.
We assume that Si is non-empty for all i, which rules out uninteresting cases where selling
to a particular bidder is never socially optimal.
2.1 Mechanisms using equity plus (possibly negative) cash
We first analyze mechanisms in which the winner pays with combinations of equity and cash.
Without loss of generality, we consider direct-revelation mechanisms. Let Wi(zi,v−i) be the
probability bidder i wins when he reports being type zi and other bidders report v−i; let
Qi(zi,v−i) ∈ [0, 1] (1)
be the equity share that bidder i retains contingent on winning; and let Mi(zi,v−i) ∈
(−∞,∞) be the associated cash payment. We define Gi (zi) to be the probability that
bidder i wins when he reports zi and all other bidders report truthfully:
Gi (zi) ≡
∫
Wi (zi,v−i) f−i (v−i) dv−i. (2)
Similarly, we define qi (zi) to be the expected equity share that bidder i retains conditional
on winning by reporting that he has valuation zi when all others report truthfully,
qi (zi)Gi (zi) ≡
∫
Qi (zi,v−i)Wi (zi,v−i) f−i (v−i) dv−i, (3)
and define ωi to be the unconditional expected cash payment,
ωi (zi) ≡
∫
Mi
(
zi,v−i
)
Wi
(
zi,v−i
)
f−i (v−i) dv−i. (4)
We define hi (vi, zi) to be bidder i’s expected profit when he has valuation vi but reports
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zi, and all other bidders report truthfully:
hi (vi, zi) ≡
∫
[viQi (zi,v−i)− xi (vi)]Wi (zi,v−i) f−i (v−i) dv−i − ωi (zi)
= [viqi (zi)− xi (vi)]Gi (zi)− ωi (zi) . (5)
Bidder i’s equilibrium expected profit is hi (vi, vi). Incentive compatibility requires
hi (vi, vi) = max
zi
hi (vi, zi) . (6)
By the envelope theorem,
hi (vi, vi) = hi (vi, vi) +
∫ vi
vi
(
qi (t)− dxi (t)
dt
)
Gi (t) dt
and
dhi (vi, vi)
dvi
=
(
qi (vi)− dxi (vi)
dvi
)
Gi (vi) . (7)
We next identify necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism using combinations
of equity and cash to exist that extracts full rents—the highest-NPV bidder wins if his NPV
is positive and a seller retains the asset otherwise, and all bidder types earn zero rent. If
such a mechanism exists, then
hi (vi, vi) = 0 for all vi, (8)
and Gi (vi) > 0 if and only if vi ∈ Si. For zi ∈ Si, divide both sides of (5) by Gi (zi) to define
hˆi (vi, zi) ≡ hi (vi, zi)
Gi (zi)
= viqi (zi)− xi (vi)− ωi (zi)
Gi (zi)
, (9)
which is bidder i’s expected profit conditional on winning when he has valuation vi but
reports zi, and all other bidders report truthfully. Equations (8) and (9) yield
hˆi (vi, vi) = 0, for all vi ∈ Si. (10)
Equation (8) and the incentive compatibility condition (6) yield
hi (vi, zi) ≤ 0, for all zi 6= vi, (11)
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and hence
hˆi (vi, zi) ≤ 0, for all zi ∈ Si.
Thus, for all vi ∈ Si, we have
hˆi (vi, vi) = max
zi∈Si
hˆi (vi, zi) = max
zi∈Si
(
viqi (zi)− xi (vi)− ωi (zi)
Gi (zi)
)
.
Adding xi (vi) to both sides yields that, for all vi ∈ Si,
hˆi (vi, vi) + xi (vi) = max
zi∈Si
(
viqi (zi)− ωi (zi)
Gi (zi)
)
. (12)
By (12), hˆi (vi, vi)+xi (vi) is the maximum of a family of affine functions and hence is weakly
convex for vi ∈ Si. Because hˆi(vi, vi) = 0, xi (vi) itself must be weakly convex for vi ∈ Si.2
The necessity of the convexity of xi(vi) reflects that the opportunity costs of higher types
must rise at least linearly with vi, else a higher vi type can extract strictly positive rents
from an equity-cash combination designed to extract all rents from lower valuation types.
Thus, a necessary condition for full extraction is that xi(vi) be weakly convex:
Lemma 1 If xi (vi) is not weakly convex over vi ∈ Si for all i, then combinations of equity
plus cash cannot extract all surplus, even if the cash component is allowed to be negative.
We now provide all necessary conditions for there to exist a mechanism employing com-
binations of equity and cash that extracts full rents. These conditions are also sufficient:
Theorem 1 A mechanism using combinations of equity and (possibly negative) cash exists
that extracts full rents if and only if for all bidders i, (i) xi (vi) is weakly convex in vi ∈ Si, (ii)
0 ≤ dxi(vi)
dvi
≤ 1 for vi ∈ Si, and (iii) for vi /∈ Si, xi(vi) ≥ xi(zi) + x′i(zi) (vi − zi) for zi ∈ Si.
In the special case that bidders are ex-ante identical and surplus is always positive, vi ∈ Si
for all vi, rendering condition (iii) irrelevant. Then Theorem 1 takes a simpler form:
2If Si is not connected, then the requirement translates to requiring that a weakly convex function of
vi go through
(
vi, xi (vi)
)
for all vi ∈ Si. The assumptions that xi(vi) is twice differentiable and Si is
non-empty imply that Si must be connected if (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 hold. However, with a finite type
space, as in Example 1, Si need not be connected.
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Corollary 1 When bidders are ex-ante identical with v − x (v) > 0 for all v ∈ [v, v¯], a
mechanism using combinations of equity and (possibly negative) cash exists that extracts full
rents if and only if x(v) is weakly convex in v and 0 ≤ dx(v)
dv
≤ 1 for v ∈ [v, v¯].
Returning to the more general case of (possibly) heterogeneous bidders, we next establish
some salient properties of the optimal mechanism.
Corollary 2 When conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1 hold, the following dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism extracts full rents:
• The winning rule isWi (vi,v−i) =
{
1 if vi ∈ Si and vi − xi (vi) > maxj 6=i vj − xj (vj)
0 otherwise
,
and ties are broken arbitrarily.
• The winning bidder retains equity share
Qi (vi,v−i) =
dxi (vi)
dvi
, (13)
and makes cash payment
Mi (vi,v−i) = vi
dxi (vi)
dvi
− xi (vi) . (14)
Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 2: We first prove that when the conditions in The-
orem 1 hold, the mechanism in Corollary 2 extracts full rents. If bidding is truthful, then
substituting for Mi(vi,v−i) and qi(vi) in equation (5) reveals that a bidder’s equilibrium
payoff is zero, regardless of his valuation, i.e.,
[qi(vi)vi − xi (vi)−Mi(vi,v−i)]Gi(vi) = 0.
To see that truthful bidding is an equilibrium, suppose type vi bids as if he is type zi. If zi /∈
Si, the bidder would lose, so the deviation is not optimal. If zi ∈ Si, then by (13) and (14),
qi (zi) =
dxi (zi)
dzi
(15)
and
ωi (zi) =
[
zi
dxi (zi)
dzi
− xi (zi)
]
Gi (zi) . (16)
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Then by (5), we have
hi (vi, zi) =
[
vi
dxi (zi)
dzi
− xi (vi)
]
Gi (zi)−
[
zi
dxi (zi)
dzi
− xi (zi)
]
Gi (zi)
=
[
(vi − zi) dxi (zi)
dzi
− xi (vi) + xi (zi)
]
Gi (zi) ≤ 0, (17)
where the inequality (17) holds for all vi ∈ [vi, v¯i]: if vi ∈ Si, the inequality follows because
the weak convexity of xi (·) (in condition (i) of Theorem 1) implies that (vi − zi) dxi(zi)dzi −
xi (vi) + xi (zi) ≤ 0 regardless of whether vi ≥ zi or vi < zi; if vi 6= Si, the inequality follows
from part (iii) of Theorem 1. Thus, deviation is not profitable for all bidder types. Hence,
Corollary 2 and the “if” part of Theorem 1 are established.
We next prove the “only if” part of Theorem 1 by assuming that a full-extraction mecha-
nism exists. The necessity of condition (i) was proved in the text. Further, for all vi ∈ Si, full
extraction implies Gi (vi) > 0 and
dhi(vi,vi)
dvi
= 0, which, by (7), yields dxi(vi)
dvi
= qi (vi). By (1),
condition (ii) follows. To prove that (iii) must hold, note that full extraction implies that for
all types vi /∈ Si, bidding as if the bidder’s type is z ∈ Si must render a non-positive profit;
by (17) and Gi (zi) > 0, we have (vi − zi) dxi(zi)dzi − xi (vi) + xi (zi) ≤ 0, establishing (iii).
Condition (i) of Theorem 1 ensures that no type in Si—the set of types for which the
social surplus from selling the asset to them is positive—wants to mimic another type in Si.
Condition (ii) reflects the constraint that the retained equity share must be between zero
and one. Specifically, dxi(vi)
dvi
≥ 0 says that bidder types that expect to generate higher rev-
enues also face higher opportunity costs. If this condition does not hold, then a bidder who
expects to generate higher revenues can extract strictly positive surplus from an equity-cash
combination designed to extract all surplus from any lower vi type. The requirement that
dxi(vi)
dvi
≤ 1 means that it is socially more efficient to allocate the asset to a higher vi type even
though that type also has higher opportunity costs. If this condition does not hold, then any
equity cash combination designed to extract all rents from a vi type for which
dxi(vi)
dvi
> 1 will
provide strictly positive rents to marginally lower types. Condition (ii) is mild—in practice,
it is likely to be satisfied. In particular, Condition (ii) is equivalent to requiring that the
synergy a bidder can generate increases in its standalone value (via the relation that synergy
equals v − x). Condition (iii) ensures that types not in Si to whom the asset should not
be sold do not want to mimic a type in Si to whom the seller might want to sell the asset.
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Condition (iii) is implied if condition (i) also holds for vi /∈ Si: Condition (iii) is weaker than
requiring (i) to hold for vi /∈ Si (given that (i) is required for vi ∈ Si). The difference in the
restrictiveness of the two conditions reflects that for any type in Si, one must ensure that
no other type wants to mimic it. By contrast, for types not in Si, such a requirement is
unnecessary because mimicking a type that is not in Si always loses.
Corollary 3 In the full extraction mechanism (Corollary 2), higher types pay with flatter
securities: the equity share paid falls with type and the cash payment rises with type, i.e.,
d
dx
(1−Qi (vi)) = −d
2xi (vi)
d2vi
≤ 0 and dMi (vi)
dvi
= vi
d2xi (vi)
d2vi
≥ 0.
This corollary reveals the general principle underlying the gains from mixing cash and
equity: a seller can tailor the menu of cash-equity payment combinations so that (1) higher
types that expect to generate higher revenues from the project (but incur higher opportunity
costs) choose a less steep mix that requires them to give up a smaller equity claim to those
revenues in return for a higher cash payment;3 while (2) lower types choose steeper mixes be-
cause they care less about ceding greater equity claims to lower revenues, and more about the
cash payment. The net effect is to reduce the differential rents between high and low types.
The rent-extracting ability of the cash-equity mix (Corollary 2) and Corollary 3 can
reconcile findings by Andrade et al. (2001) for mergers and acquisitions that (1) a target
(seller) appears to grasp all synergy gains—the acquirer does not earn a positive abnormal
return—and (2) the target’s abnormal return is higher when an acquirer’s payment has a
larger cash component (revealing that its type is larger).4
The mechanism in Corollary 2 has the desirable feature that it is dominant strategy
incentive compatible. A bidder’s winning payment depends only on his own report, and
not those of other bidders; and if a bidder misreports and wins, his profit is non-positive.
Thus, the mechanism extracts full rents even from a single bidder absent any competition,
3In contrast, in equity auctions with constant opportunity costs, a higher type always gives up a larger
claim to outbid lower types.
4Our mechanism applies to settings in which the seller has the bargaining power. The seller optimally
offers a menu of payment choices for bidders, in which higher cash payments are associated with reduced
equity claims. Higher valuation bidders select mixtures with higher cash payments, and the seller awards
the asset to the bidder who offers the highest cash payment. Example 2 illustrates how the mechanism can
be implemented in an auction.
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and bidders would not deviate even in complete information setting (when there are multiple
bidders). Moreover, if xi (vi) is strictly convex over [xi, x¯i], the equilibrium enforces itself in a
strict sense: bidder i would receive a strictly negative expected profit if he deviated and won.
2.2 Mechanisms using equity plus positive cash
The cash payments specified in Corollary 2 needed to extract all rents could be negative. In
practice, there may be concerns with negative cash payments (DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzy-
pacz 2005). Empirically, mixtures of securities with positive cash payments are often ob-
served, for example in mergers and acquisitions, but negative cash payments are not. We now
provide the additional necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal mechanism to specify
that the winning bidder make a strictly positive cash payment (ωi (vi) > 0 for all vi ∈ Si):
Corollary 4 Suppose that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1 hold. Then, if
d
dvi
xi(vi)
vi
> 0 for all i, (18)
the mechanism specified in Corollary 2 uses strictly positive combinations of equity and cash
and extracts all rents, generating strictly higher expected revenues than either pure equity or
pure cash. If these conditions do not hold then no mechanism can extract full rents using
combinations of equity and strictly positive cash.
To see that the result holds, observe that when the conditions in Theorem 1 and (18)
hold, the mechanism specified in Corollary 2 extracts full rents. Further, by (18), the cash
component in (14), vi
dxi(vi)
dvi
− xi(vi), is strictly positive. Moreover, a seller must use strictly
positive amounts of both cash and equity to extract full rents. To see the converse part
of Corollary 4, suppose a full-extraction mechanism exists that employs strictly positive
cash. For all vi ∈ Si, full extraction implies Gi (vi) > 0 and dhi(vi,vi)dvi = 0, which yields
dxi(vi)
dvi
= qi (vi) by (7). By hi (vi, vi) = 0 and (5),
ωi (vi) =
(
dxi (vi)
dvi
vi − xi (vi)
)
Gi(vi),
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which, by ωi (vi) > 0 as implied by cash component being positive, yields
dxi (vi)
dvi
vi − xi (vi) > 0,
which yields (18).
Equation (18), which is equivalent to the elasticity condition d lnxi
d ln vi
> 1, is the necessary
and sufficient condition for bidding strategies in second-price equity auctions to be decreasing
(Che and Kim 2010). This follows because the bidding strategy in second-price equity auc-
tions takes the form 1− xi
vi
.5 In Corollary 4, it ensures that cash transfers are positive. Impor-
tantly, this condition is unrelated to the scale of opportunity costs relative to valuations. For
example, it holds for all xi = αv
β for β ≥ 1 (when α is small enough that condition (ii) holds).
The following example illustrates that a higher-NPV type can earn higher rents in an eq-
uity auction than a lower type, and hence earn strictly positive rents in pure equity and pure
cash auctions, but nonetheless earns zero rents when equity and cash are combined optimally.
Example 1. Suppose there are two ex-ante identical bidders whose expected valuations can
take on one of three values, vi ∈ {1, 2, 5}, with associated probabilities, 0.1, 0.1 and 0.8, and
associated opportunity costs of x(1) = 0.1, x(2) = 0.3, and x(5) = 3.
Consider second price equity auctions in which ties are broken randomly. A bidder with
valuation v then bids to retain an equity share of x(v)
v
. The parameterization implies that
strategies decrease with a bidder’s valuation. A bidder with low valuation v = 1 wins when
the rival bidder has valuation 2 and bids to retain share 0.3
2
; he wins with when the rival
bidder has valuation 5 and bids to retain share 3
5
; and his profits are zero when they have
the same valuation. Thus, type v = 1’s expected profit is
piv=1 = 0.1×
(
0.3
2
× 1− 0.1
)
+ 0.8×
(
3
5
× 1− 0.1
)
=
0.01
2
+ 0.4 = 0.405.
A bidder with valuation v = 2 earns expected profit of
piv=2 = 0.80×
(
3
5
× 2− 0.3
)
= 0.72 > piv=1.
This example has a discrete set of types corresponding to three points in the v vs x plane.
5This reflects that a bidder who retains an equity stake of xivi , just breaks even,
xi
vi
vi − xi = 0.
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Condition (i) of Theorem 1 for full extraction demands that a weakly convex function x(v)
go through these three points, and there is an infinite number of such functions, giving rise
to an infinite number of ways to implement the mechanism in Corollary 4. Observe that a
straight line joining points 1 and 2 has a slope of 0.3−0.1
2−1 = 0.2; and a straight line joining
points 2 and 3 has a slope of 3−0.3
5−2 = 0.9, which exceeds 0.2. Denote by k (1), k (2) and
k (5) the slope dxi(vi)
dvi
that determines the equity retention (see (13)) at these 3 points. Then
the only constraints imposed by the convexity requirement on x(v) are: k (1) ∈ [0, 0.2] ,
k (2) ∈ [0.2, 0.9], and k (3) ∈ [0.9, 1]. Below, we (arbitrarily) pick k (1) = 0.15, k (2) = 0.55,
and k (5) = 0.95. The mechanism in Corollary 4 yields:
• If the reported value is v = 1, pay fraction 0.85 of equity and 0.05 in cash.
• If the reported value is v = 2, pay fraction 0.45 of equity and 0.8 in cash.
• If the reported value is v = 5, pay fraction 0.05 of equity and 1.75 in cash.
• The highest reported type wins and ties are broken randomly.
Substitution into a bidder’s expected profits reveals that truth telling results in zero payoffs
and deviating results in strictly negative payoffs. In this example, in an equity auction, a
higher-NPV type (v = 2) earns higher rents than a lower NPV type (v = 1). Thus, both
in pure equity auctions and in pure cash auctions, v = 2 earns strictly more rents than
v = 1. Nonetheless the optimal strictly positive mixture of equity and cash extracts rents
more efficiently, so that both v = 2 and v = 1 earn zero rents.
Implementation. The full extraction mechanism can be implemented via cash plus a de-
creasing royalty-rate as follows. By Corollary 3, the equity share paid falls with vi and the
cash payment rises with vi. Therefore, the equity share paid can be expressed as a strictly
decreasing function of the cash payment. This means that the full extraction mechanism
can be implemented by having bidders bid in cash, and setting a reserve price that equals
the cash payment in (14) for zero-NPV type (or for type vi if all types have positive NPVs).
The bidder with the highest bid exceeding the reserve wins (assuming ex-ante identical bid-
ders; the approach generalizes) and pays his own bid. However, for each cash bid made, a
bidder must pay an additional equity share that is uniquely determined by his cash bid via
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the function determined above. As with the mechanism in Corollary 2, this implementation
has the desirable feature that it is dominant strategy incentive compatible; and if xi (vi) is
strictly convex for all i, the equilibrium is unique.
Example 2. Let there be n ex-ante identical bidders with expected valuation v distributed
on [2, 3] and associated opportunity costs x(v) = 0.3 + 0.4v + 0.1v2.
Let c be the cash bid and α(c) be the associated royalty rate paid. We solve for the α(c)
that extracts all rents. By (14), c relates to v via c = v dx(v)
dv
− x (v) = 0.1v2 + 0.3. Solving
for v in terms of c yields v =
√
10c+ 3. By (13), 1 − α = dx(v)
dv
= 0.4 + 0.2v. Solving for α
in terms of c yields:
α (c) = 0.6− 0.2√10c+ 3. (19)
Now, consider a first-price auction in which the highest cash bid wins and the winner pays
his cash bid c plus the royalty rate given by (19). Denote the expected profit of a type v
bidder conditional on winning by pi(c; v). Then
pi (c; v) = (1− α (c)) v − c− x (v) = 0.2√10c+ 3v − c− 0.3− 0.1v2.
pi (c; v) is concave in c. It is straightforward to show (via dpi
dc
= v/
√
10c+ 3− 1) that for all
v, the maximum value of pi (c; v) is zero, which obtains at
c = 0.1v2 − 0.3, (20)
and that pi(c; v) < 0 for all other values of c. Because a bidder’s losing profit is zero, bidding
according to (20) is optimal regardless of how other bidders bid. In equilibrium, all bidders
receive zero rent. Because (20) strictly increases in v, the highest valuation bidder wins and
the NPV is strictly positive: the seller extracts full rents.
This example highlights another novel feature of our implementation: in a first-price
aution using combinations of cash with a royalty rate that declines in the cash bid has an
equilibrium in which bidders employ dominant strategies. By contrast, if bidders pay with
either pure cash or pure equity, a first-price auction does not have a dominant strategy
equilibrium (even if bidders have type-dependent opportunity costs).
Robustness. Our mechanism is robust to Samuelson’s (1987) concerns about mechanisms
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that extract all surplus via contingent payments. First, the equilibrium strictly enforces
itself if xi (vi) is strictly convex: bidder i expects strictly negative profits from deviating and
winning. This makes selection of the ‘right’ bidder robust to small noise. Second, a winning
bidder almost never gives up all equity, mitigating moral hazard concerns.
We now establish a third robustness property, deriving a lower bound on seller revenues
when full extraction is impossible via combinations of cash and equity. We show that if xi(vi)
is not quite weakly convex, or there is slight uncertainty about the value of xi conditional on
vi, combining securities of differing degrees of steepness can still extract almost all surplus.
For simplicity, we consider a single bidder and assume that it is socially optimal to sell
to any bidder type, i.e., v − x (v) > 0 for all v. Thus, the maximum social welfare gain is
Π ≡
∫ v¯
v
(v − x (v)) f (v) dv.
Proposition 1 Let y (v) be a weakly convex function over v ∈ [v, v¯] with 0 ≤ dy(v)
dv
≤ 1 for
all v ∈ [v, v¯]. Then if the opportunity cost function is x(v), an equity-plus-cash mechanism
generates expected revenue of at least
Π− sup
v′∈[v,v¯]
(x(v′)− y(v′)) + inf
v′∈[v,v¯]
(x(v′)− y(v′)) .
In this mechanism, the bidder always wins the asset, W (v) = 1, retains equity share
Q (v) =
dy (v)
dv
, (21)
and makes cash payment
M (v) = v
dy (v)
dv
− y (v)− sup
v′∈[v,v¯]
(x(v′)− y(v′)) . (22)
Proof: See appendix.
Intuitively, for any y(v) that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1, the prescribed
mechanism is incentive compatible for any true x(v): the bidder’s payoff is (weakly) higher
if he truthfully reports his type v than if he misreports. Furthermore, changing the cash
payment by a constant—replacing the cash payment with v dy(v)
dv
− y (v) − δ, where δ is
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a constant—only affects individual rationality constraints and not incentive compatibility
constraints. Thus, by properly choosing δ, both the incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints can be satisfied. Specifically, setting δ = sup (x(v)− y(v)) leaves the
bidder type with the highest x(v)− y(v) zero rents, and it leaves all other bidder types with
non-negative rents that do not exceed sup (x(v)− y(v))− inf (x(v)− y(v)).
Proposition 1 implies that when x(v) is “close” to being weakly convex, the seller can
extract almost all surplus. Moreover, this result holds even if x does not evolve deterministi-
cally with v, extending to settings where x and v are jointly distributed on a two dimensional
space, where, for example, conditional on v, x is distributed on support [x (v)− , x (v) + ].
Thus, even if the seller only knows approximately how x is related to v, our mechanism may
still deliver close to full extraction, underscoring its robustness.6
Cre´mer (1987) shows that when xi is constant and common knowledge, a seller can extract
full rents by reimbursing a bidder for his opportunity cost, and asking for all equity.7 Our
work extends his insights to settings in which xi varies with bidder’s private type. Theorem 1
provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for full extraction in such environments (ob-
serve that Cre´mer’s assumption that xi is constant satisfies the weak convexity condition of
Theorem 1) and Corollary 2 shows how to extract full rents when these conditions are met: a
seller should tailor a menu of combinations of equity and cash, where the relative weights vary
in such a way that higher types choose less steep mixes and lower types choose steeper mixes.
We now go beyond the equity-plus-cash framework to show that a seller can do better: we
identify settings in which full extraction is impossible using equity and cash—the necessary
conditions in Theorem 1 do not hold—but a seller can still extract all surplus using cash
and a steeper-than-equity security.
2.3 Extending to ordered securities other than equity
We next consider settings in which bidders pay with combinations of cash and securities.
For simplicity, we focus on a single bidder.8 To ease presentation, we assume that (i) each
6See Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2017) for related robustness analyses.
7See Fishman (1989), Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990), or Gorbenko and Malenko (2018) for papers
in which cash-equity compositions arise due to preemption, signaling, or financial constraint considerations.
8The mechanism generalizes to allow the seller to extract full rents from multiple bidders, while
maintaining dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
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bidder type v = E [y|v] corresponds to a positive net present value, i.e., v−x(v) > 0, and (ii)
a higher expected cash flow corresponds both to a higher opportunity cost and to a higher
NPV, i.e., 0 < dx(v)
dv
< 1, for all v.
We consider an ordered set of securities, {S(s, ·);s ∈ (s, s)}, as introduced in DeMarzo et
al. (2005). Each security in such a set is indexed by s, where for each s, S(s, ·) specifies the
payoff of the security as a function of the stochastic cash flows that the asset generates. For
example, for the set of equity securities, the index s is the equity fraction and the payoff func-
tion is S(s, y) = sy. More generally, we require (i) for all s and y ∈ [0,∞), both S(s, y) and
y− S(s, y) weakly increase in y, and 0 ≤ S(s, y) ≤ y; and (ii) ES(s, vi) ≡ E [S(s, yi)|vi], the
expected value of security S(s, ·) conditional on bidder type v, is strictly increasing in both
arguments, differentiable in s, and twice differentiable in v. We let ESs (s, v) and ESv (s, v)
denote the partial derivatives with respect to s and v, and denote the second derivative with
respect to v by ESvv (s, v) ≡ ∂2ES(s,v)∂v2 . To ease analysis, we assume:
Assumption 1 (i) If s1 > s2, then S (s1, y) ≥ S (s2, y) for all y ∈ (0,∞), and S (s1, y) ≥
S (s2, y) is weakly increasing in y ∈ (0,∞), strictly increasing over a positive measure of y.
(ii) The lower bound s corresponds to zero payment and the upper bound s¯ corresponds
to full payment: for any  > 0, there exist s∗ and s∗∗ such that for all v, ES (s∗, v) < ,
ESv (s
∗, v) < , ES (s∗∗, v) > v − , and ESv (s∗, v) > 1− .
Part (i) says that the payment increases in the security index, and the difference in pay-
ment widens as the underlying cash flow rises. Part (ii) ensures a wide enough range in the se-
curity index. For instance, for call options, s corresponds to infinite strike and s¯ corresponds
to zero strike. Both parts hold for standard securities (e.g., debt, equity, or call options).
We consider direct-revelation mechanisms featuring a security plus cash. We first do not
restrict the sign of cash. Let W (z) be the probability that the bidder wins when he reports
being type z; let s(z) denote the associated index of the security paid when he reports type
z and wins; and let M(z) ∈ (−∞,∞) be the cash payment when he reports type z and wins.
Thus, the bidder’s expected profit when he has valuation v but reports z is
h (v, z) = (v − x (v)− ES (s (z) , v)−M (z))W (z) . (23)
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If a full-extraction mechanism exists, then h(v, v) = 0 and W (v) = 1 for all v (recall that
all bidder types have positive NPV). Then
h (v, z) = v − x (v)− ES (s (z) , v)−M (z) . (24)
Given our full extraction focus, we use (24) in lieu of (23) for h. Incentive compatibility yields
v ∈ arg max
z
h (v, z) , for all v. (25)
Thus, h(v, z) ≤ 0 for all z 6= v, which, combined with h(z, z) = 0 for all z, yields
z ∈ arg max
v
h (v, z) , for all z. (26)
Equation (26) holds when a mechanism extracts full rents (or more generally when all bid-
der types receive the same rent). It is instructive to examine its relation to (25). W (v) = 1,
h(v, v) = 0 for all vi, and the incentive compatibility condition (25) are necessary and suffi-
cient for the mechanism to extract full rents. A similar relation holds for (26):
Lemma 2 A mechanism extracts full rents if and only if W (v) = 1 and h(v, v) = 0 for all
v and (26) holds.
This follows directly: When h(v, v) = 0 for all v, (25) and (26) imply each other. Lemma
2 simplifies the identification of the conditions for full extraction vis a` vis working directly
with (25).9 Equation (24) and the first-order condition for (26), ∂h(v,z)
∂v
|v=z = 0 yield (upon
substituting v for z), for all v:
1− x′ (v)− ESv (s (v) , v) = 0. (27)
Lemma 3 For all v ∈ [v, v¯], (27) has a unique solution.
Proof: See appendix.
9While the first-order condition of (26) is the same as the standard envelope condition, the second-order
condition is more tractable than that of (25).
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The second-order condition of (26) gives
∂2h (v, z)
∂v2
|v=z = −d
2x (z)
dz2
− ESvv (s (z) , z) ≤ 0,
which, upon replacing z with v, yields a necessary condition for full extraction:
Corollary 5 If combinations of (possibly negative) cash and security from an ordered set
extracts full rents, then for all vi ∈ [v, v¯],
d2x (v)
dv2
≥ −ESvv (s (v) , v) , where s(v) solves (27). (28)
When the security is equity, the right-hand side of (28) is zero: (28) just says that x (v)
must be weakly convex. By Theorem 1, this is also sufficient for full extraction via equity
plus cash. For a general set of ordered securities, matters are more complicated: unlike with
equities, where each security can be expressed as a “fraction” of a single base-security, for a
general set such as the family of call options indexed by different strikes, securities cannot
be expressed as fractions of each other. As a result, (28) is typically not sufficient for global
optimality. We next identify sufficient conditions, showing that if x (v) is concave, but not
‘too’ concave, combinations of steeper-than-equity securities and cash can still extract full
rents. To proceed, define
k (v) ≡ min
z 6=v,z∈[v,v¯]
∫ z
v
ESvv (s (v) , v) dv
z − v (29)
for v ∈ [v, v¯] where s(v) solves (27). Here, k(v) is a measure of the minimum average second
derivative of expected revenues generated by the security indexed by s(v), where the average
is taken over points between v and any other point z ∈ [ v, v¯]. Define
K ≡ min
v∈[v,v¯]
k (v) , (30)
to be the lower bound on this measure over all v ∈ [v, v¯]. Because the minimum of averages
is no less than the minimum of individual elements,
k (v) ≥ min
v,z∈[v,v¯]
ESvv (s (v) , z)
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for all v ∈ [v, v¯], which, by (30), yields
K ≥ min
v,z∈[v,v¯]
ESvv (s (v) , z) . (31)
Inequality (31) adds to the usefulness of the sufficient conditions for full extraction:
Theorem 2 If x′′ (v) + K ≥ 0 for all v, then a mechanism combining cash and security
exists that extracts full rents. The mechanism allocates the asset to the bidder, W (v) = 1,
the security payment s(v) solves (27), and the cash payment is
M(v) = v − x(v)− ES(s(v), v). (32)
Corollary 6 Suppose that bidding strategies would be strictly decreasing in a pure second-
price security-bid auction. Then the mechanism in Theorem 2 features strictly positive cash
payments and generates strictly higher revenues than pure cash or pure securities.
Proofs: See appendix.
The condition in Theorem 2 that x′′ (v) ≥ −K for all v is a sufficient condition for full
extraction via security plus cash. Equity has a linear payoff function, so k (v) in (29) is zero
for all v, and hence K = 0. Thus, with equity, the condition just requires x′′(v) ≥ 0, i.e., that
x(v) be weakly convex. This is precisely condition (i) in our equity analysis in Theorem 1.
When the set of securities is steeper than equities, K tends to be positive, which relaxes the
convexity requirement on x (·) needed for full extraction. To illustrate, we use the leading
example from DeMarzo et al. (2005) for cash flow distributions.
Assumption 2 (DKS) The cash flow y = θv, where θ is distributed over (0,∞) with a
mean of 1 and independent of v, and log(θ) has a log-concave density function.
For instance, θ could be log-normally distributed. This structure guarantees sMLRP.
To begin, consider a call option with strike price v∗ > 0. Write the expected cash flow
for bidder type v as ES(v∗, v) (with abuse of notation because v∗ is not a proper index, as a
higher strike price corresponds to a lower payoff). Let fθ (·) denote the distribution of θ. Then
ES(v∗, v) =
∫ ∞
v∗
v
(θv − v∗) fθ (θ) dθ,
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and
ESv(v
∗, v) =
∫ ∞
v∗
v
θfθ (θ) dθ and ESvv(v
∗, v) =
(v∗)2
v3
fθ
(
v∗
v
)
> 0.
Thus, K > 0 (see (31)) for call options. For securities other than call options, we have:
Lemma 4 If Assumption 2 holds and the payoff function of each security s is weakly con-
vex over (0,∞), almost everywhere twice differentiable, but not a straight line, then ESvv(s (v) , v) >
0 for all v, where s(v) solves (27).
Proof: See appendix.
If every security in an ordered set has a weakly convex payoff function as in the lemma,
then the set is steeper than equity (Lemma 5, DeMarzo et al. 2005). By Lemma 4 and (31),
K > 0, which, by Theorem 2, relaxes the requirement for full extraction on the convexity of
x (·) relative to equity. Moreover, the steeper is the security, the larger is K. Intuitively, the
security payment and opportunity cost collectively comprise a bidder’s costs, and curvature
in a security’s expected payoff can compensate for a lack of convexity in x (·). Example
3 below shows that a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism employing com-
binations of call options and cash can extract all surplus when equity and cash cannot,
underscoring how steeper securities help further in the rent extraction.
Example 3. Consider a single bidder whose valuations can take on values, v ∈ {5, 6, 7}, each
with strictly positive probability, and associated opportunity costs of x(5) = 1, x(6) = 1.6,
and x(7) = 1.9. For type vi, the cash flow y is uniformly distributed between [v − 1, v + 1].
In this example, x(v) is not weakly convex: the slope of the line joining points 1 and 2 is
1.6−1
6−5 = 0.6, and the slope of the line joining points 2 and 3 is
1.9−1.6
7−6 = 0.3 < 0.6. Thus, by
Theorem 1, full extraction is impossible using equity plus cash, even when cash components
can be negative. However, a seller can extract full rents using call options plus cash, where
the cash component is positive (because the use of call options results in decreasing bidding
strategies). The payments are as follows.
• If the bidder reports v = 5, he pays a call option with strike 5 plus 3.75 in cash;
• If the bidder reports v = 6, he pays a call option with strike 6 plus 4.15 in cash.
21
• If the bidder reports v = 7, he pays a call option with strike 7 plus 4.85 in cash.
Expected payments for the
• call option with strike 5 are 0.25 for v = 5, 1 for v = 6, and 2 for v = 7.
• call option with strike 6 are 0 for v = 5, 0.25 for v = 6, and 1 for v = 7.
• call option with strike 7 are 0 for v = 5 and v = 6, and 0.25 for v = 7.
Substitution into a bidder’s expected profits reveals that truth telling results in zero
payoffs and deviating results in strictly negative payoffs. Thus, the mechanism is incentive
compatible and all rents are extracted.
3 Conclusion
We show that auctions that combine securities with differing steepness may yield higher
revenues than using securities of the same steepness when bidders who expect to generate
higher revenues from winning the asset also face higher opportunity costs. The advantages
of combining arise because the differential rents of high over low bidder types may change
sign between sets of securities with differing steepness. Positive mixtures of different sets of
securities can balance those differential rents to zero and achieve full surplus extraction.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a seller to be able to extract all rents
from bidders by combining cash and equity, both when the cash payment is restricted to be
positive, and when cash can be negative. These results are robust: if the conditions for full
extraction only approximately hold, our mechanism still extracts almost all surplus. We then
show that combining cash with steeper-than-equity securities can extract full rents in settings
where cash plus equity can not. Collectively, our findings indicate that a seller should com-
bine the least-steep security (cash) with the steepest security. Tailored to different types, the
mix creates wider variation in steepness, which helps to reduce the differential rents of higher
types over lower types and to ensure the global incentive compatibility of the mechanism.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: If bidding is truthful, then the expected profit of a type v bidder is
h (v, v) = y (v)− x (v) + sup
v′∈[v,v¯]
(x(v′)− y(v′)) . (33)
This expected profit is nonnegative and no more than supv′ (x(v
′)− y(v′))−infv′ (x(v′)− y(v′))
for all v. Thus, individual rationality is satisfied. Next we show truthful bidding is incentive
compatible. By (21), (22), (13), (3) and (4), we have
q (z) =
dy (z)
dz
and ω (z) = z
dy (z)
dz
− y (z)− sup
v′∈[v,v¯]
(x(v′)− y(v′)) . (34)
Then by (5),
h (v, z) =
[
v
dy (z)
dz
− x (v)
]
−
[
z
dy (z)
dz
− y (z)− sup
v′∈[v,v¯]
(x(v′)− y(v′))
]
=
[
(v − z) dy (z)
dz
− (y (v)− y (z))
]
+ h (v, v) , (35)
where (35) follows from (33). Then by the weak convexity of y (·), (v − z) dy(z)
dz
− (y (v) −
y (z)) ≤ 0 regardless of whether v ≤ z or v > z. Thus, (35) yields
h (v, z)− h (v, v) ≤ 0,
establishing the incentive compatibility of truthful bidding. Furthermore, truthful bidding
maximizes social welfare, establishing the result.
Proof of Lemma 3: Claim 1: ESv(s, v) is increasing in s for all v. For s1 > s2, we have
ESv(s1, v)− ESv(s2, v) =
∫
[s1(y)− s2(y)]gv(y|v))dy.
Because gv integrates to zero (g is a probability density), there exists a y
∗ such that
gv(y
∗|v) = 0. gv(y|v)
g(y|v) is monotone increasing in y by the sMLRP. Thus, for y < y
∗, gv(y|v)
g(y|v) < 0
and hence gv(y|v) < 0; and for y > y∗, gv(y|v)g(y|v) > 0 and hence gv(y|v) > 0. Then since
s1(y)− s2(y) is weakly increasing by Assumption 1,
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∫
y<y∗
[S (s1, y)− S (s2, y)]gv(y|v)dy ≥
∫
y<y∗
[S (s1, y
∗)− S (s2, y∗)]gv(y|v)dy
and ∫
y>y∗
[S (s1, y)− S (s2, y)]gv(y|v)dy ≥
∫
y>y∗
[S (s1, y
∗)− S (s2, y∗)]gv(y|v)dy.
Because S (s1, y)−S (s2, y) strictly increases over a positive measure of y, one of the inequal-
ities is strict. Adding yields Claim 1:
ESv(s1, v)− ESv(s2, v) =
∫
y<y∗
[S (s1, y)− S (s2, y)]gv(y|v)dy +
∫
y>y∗
[S (s1, y)− S (s2, y)]gv(y|v)dy
>
∫
y<y∗
[S (s1, y
∗)− S (s2, y∗)]gv(y|v)dy +
∫
y>y∗
[S (s1, y
∗)− S (s2, y∗)]gv(y|v)dy = 0.
Lemma 3 then follows from Claim 1 and Assumption 1.
Proof of Theorem 2: If bidding is truthful, then substituting for M(v) in (24) reveals
that a bidder’s equilibrium payoff is zero, regardless of his valuation. To see that truthful
bidding is an equilibrium, by Lemma 2, it suffices to establish that ∂h(v,z)
∂v
≥ 0 for v < z and
that ∂h(v,z)
∂v
≤ 0 for v > z. We have ∂h(v,z)
∂v
= l (v, z) , where
l (v, z) ≡ 1− x′ (v)− ESv (s (z) , v) ,
and (27) yields l (z, z) = 0. Thus, for z 6= v,
l (v, z) = l (v, z)− l (z, z)
= x′ (z) + ESv (s (z) , z)− x′ (v)− ESv (s (z) , v)
=
∫ z
v
x′′ (v) dv +
ESv (s (z) , v)− ESv (s (z) , z)
v − z (z − v)
=
∫ z
v
x′′ (v) dv +
∫ v
z
ESvv (s (z) , v) dv
v − z (z − v)
If z > v, then by (29)
l (v, z) ≥
∫ z
v
x′′ (v) dv + k (z) (z − v)
≥
∫ z
v
x′′ (v) dv +K (z − v) =
∫ z
v
(x′′ (v) +K) dv ≥ 0,
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and if z < v, then
l (v, z) ≤
∫ z
v
x′′ (v) dv + k (z) (z − v)
≤
∫ z
v
x′′ (v) dv +K (z − v) =
∫ z
v
(x′′ (v) +K) dv ≤ 0.
Thus, ∂h(v,z)
∂v
≥ 0 for v < z, and ∂h(v,z)
∂v
≤ 0 for v > z. Thus, h (v, z) ≤ 0, ∀z 6= v.
Proof of Corollary 6: To show that M in (32) is strictly positive, suppose that M ≤ 0,
i.e., ES (s (v) , v) ≥ v − x (v). Then by Assumption 1 and v − x (v) > 0, there exists a sˆ ≤ s
such that ES (sˆ, v) = v−x (v). The premise of the corollary is that bidding strategies would
be strictly decreasing in a second-price security-bid auction. Thus, by ES (sˆ, v) = v− x (v),
ESv (sˆ, v) > 1 − x′ (v) (Lemma 1, Che and Kim 2010). By sˆ ≤ s and Claim 1 in the proof
of Lemma 3 (ESv(s, v) increases in s), ESv (s, v) > 1 − x′ (v), contradicting Theorem 2’s
premise that si solves (27). Thus, M > 0. Moreover, pure security or pure cash cannot
extract full rents because when a seller can combine them, she must use strictly positive
amounts of both to extract full rents.
Proof of Lemma 4: For notational ease, denote the security’s payoff function, S (s (v) , ·),
by S (·). Then
ES(s (v) , v) =
∫ ∞
0
S(θv)fθ(θ)dθ
and
ESvv(s(v), v) =
∫ ∞
0
θ2S ′′(θv)fθ(θ)dθ.
Because S(·) is weakly convex and not a straight line, there exist two values va and vb, with
0 < va < vb <∞, such that S ′(vb)− S ′(va) > 0. Define
b ≡ min
θ∈(va/v,vb/v)
θ2fθ (θ) > 0.
Because S ′′ ≥ 0,
ESvv(s (v) , v) ≥
∫ vb
va
θ2S ′′(θv)fθ (θ) dθ ≥ b
∫ vb
v
va
v
S ′′(θv)dθ
=
b
v
(S ′(vb)− S ′(va)) > 0.
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